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DeRose: Imagination in Northanger Abbey

IMAGINATION IN NORTHANGER ABBEY

PETER L. DeROSE

LAMAR UNIVERSITY

I
Northanger Abbey is not only a bold parody of the Gothicsentimental fiction popular at the time of its composition but also, as
many critics agree, a complex parody. In fact, A. Walton Litz claimsit
would be a mistake to read the novel as a “straightforward drama in
which...the disordered Imagination is put to flight by Reason”;
paraphrasing Lionel Trilling, he asserts that Catherine’s suspicion of
violence and uncertainty lurking beneath the surface of English
society is “nearer the truth than the complacent conviction, shared by
the readers of Mrs. Radcliffe, that life in the Home Counties is always
sane and orderly.”1 Andrew Wright concludes that though we must
dismiss the Gothic world as inadequate and false, “we cannot alto
gether apprehend the real world by good sense alone. Good sense,
ironically, is limited too.”2 More recently, Alistair Duckworth argues
that although Northanger Abbey undercuts Catherine’s “imagina
tive fantasy,” the novel also dramatizes “the fallibility of the rational
outlook.”3 Implicit in each of these positions is the assumption that
the Gothic (or sentimental) and real worlds are not altogether differ
ent, and that together Imagination and Reason will discover this
similarity. Such an assumption, however, should not be made because
it misrepresents the Lockean epistemology that underlies the literary
burlesque in Northanger Abbey and, equally significant, because it
misinterprets Jane Austen’s moral intention, shared by writers like
Samuel Johnson, to portray realistically the social dangers of every
day life.
To claim, as Wright does, that there is “more on earth than mere
common sense,” or as Duckworth claims, that Catherine’ “imagina
tive responses” lead to an “undefined recognition” of the truth, or to
suggest, as Litz and Trilling do, that Catherine’s imagination comes
closer to the truth than her reason does, not only places the primary
burden of knowing on the mental activity of reason or imagination,
but also attributes to the imagination more truth-finding functions
than Jane Austen and most other writers of her age would have
believed possible.1 It is more accurate to say that in the properly
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balanced mind, all mental activity—whether imaginative, rational,
judgmental, or volitional—is secondary to the direct experience of
sensory reality, and is, apart from experience, seriously suspect.5
Applied to Northanger Abbey, this distinction leads to important
conclusions about the parodic and realistic dimensions of the novel.
First, Jane Austen’ burlesque goes far beyond parody of mere literary
form—whether Gothic or sentimental—to expose what Samuel John
son calls in Rasselas the “dangerous prevalence of imagination.”6
Second, by teaching heroine and reader alike to see things not as they
are imagined but as they actually are, the comic-realistic episodes of
Northanger Abbey serve a genuine moral purpose—to provide “the
young, the ignorant, and the idle,” as Dr. Johnson characterized the
readers of popular fiction, with “lectures of conduct, and introductions
into life.”7
II

To appreciate fully Jane Austen’ burlesque of the imagination,
we must recall the two philosophical premises on which John Locke’s
highly influential epistemology is built—that the mind at birth is a
tabula rasa, which possesses no innate ideas, and that all our ideas
(and all our knowledge) originate in inescapable human experience,
either through sense-perception or reflection. “All those sublime
thoughts which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as heaven
itself, take their rise and footing here,” Locke formulates in one of the
most famous sentences in AnEssay Concerning Human Understand
ing; “in all the great extent wherein the mind wanders, in those remote
speculations it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond
those ideas which sense or reflection have offered for its contempla
tion.”8 Since the mind, in all its rational thinking, can contemplate
“no other immediate object but its own ideas” offered through sense
perception and reflection, all knowledge is “nothing but the percep
tion of the connexion of and agreement, or disagreement and
repugnancy of any of our ideas.”9
Jane Austen may or may not have read Locke’ Essay, but she
was familiar with Samuel Johnson’ essays and with Boswell’s Life of
Johnson.10 Heavily influenced by Locke’ theory of cognition, John
son’s thought reflects the philosophical importance Locke attached to
the experiential basis of ideas and of knowledge. Johnson once told
Boswell: “Human experience, which is constantly contradicting the
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ory, is the great test of truth. ”11 He is also reported to have told George
Staunton, who was about to travel to America for scientific purposes:
“Trust as little as you can to report; examine all you can by your own
senses.”12 Again and again, whether speaking casually or writing
formally, he asserts that we do not know anything except what we
have learned from direct or vicarious experience.13
In acquiring knowledge, that is, in the process by which ideas and
images are presented to the mind, and are arranged, classified,
abstracted, and compared, the faculty of imagination (synonymous in
the eighteenth century with “fancy”) plays a necessary, if somewhat
humble, function. Primarily a visualizing power, “imagination” is
defined in Johnson’ Dictionary as “Fancy; the power of forming ideal
pictures; the power of representing things absent to one’ self or
others.”11 Imagination, however, frequently leads us into error, for
although it can accurately represent images or ideas to the mind, it
can also rearrange their parts in ways that do not correspond with the
experienced nature of things—thus the distinction in Locke’ termi
nology between “real” and “fantastical” ideas. “By real ideas,”Locke
explains, “I mean such as have a foundation in nature; such as have a
conformity with the real being and existence of things, or with their
archetypes. Fantastical or chimerical, I call such as have no founda
tion in nature, nor have any conformity with the reality of being to
which they are tacitly referred, as to their archetypes.”15
Dr. Johnson’s distrust of the imagination derives, therefore, from
the traditional belief that by so transforming real images or ideas this
mental faculty entices man to escape reality (and to avoid action) by
withdrawing into an illusory world. In Rambler no. 125, Johnson
refers to the imagination as a “licentious and vagrant faculty, unsus
ceptible of limitations, and impatient of restraint” (Works, 4:300). In
Rambler no. 89 he draws the brief portrait of the dreamer, who “retires
to his apartments, shuts out the cares and interruptions of mankind,
and abandons himself to his own fancy.” In his solitude “new worlds
rise up before him, one image is followed by another, and a long
succession of delights dances round him.” When at length he returns
to society, the dreamer becomes peevish “because he cannot model it
to his own will....The infatuation strengthens by degrees, and, like the
poison of opiates, weakens his powers, without any external symptom
of malignity” (Works, 4:106). The dreamer later reemerges in Rasselas
with a slightly fuller characterization as the obsessed, paranoiac
astronomer, who personifies “the dangerous prevalence of imagina
tion.” As Imlac explains to Rasselas:
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There is no man whose imagination does not sometimes pre
dominate over his reason, who can regulate his attention wholly
by his will, and
ideas will come and go at his command. No
man will be found in whose mind airy notions do not sometimes
tyrannize, and force him to hope or fear beyond the limits sober
probability. All power of fancy over reason is a degree of insanity;
while this power is such as we can controul and repress, it is
not visible to others, nor considered as any depravation of the
mental faculties: it is not pronounced madness but when it
becomes ungovernable, and apparently influences speech or
action.
* * *

In time some particular train of ideas fixes the attention; all
other intellectual gratifications are rejected, the mind, in weari
ness or leisure, recurs constantly to the favourite conception, and
feasts on the
falsehood, whenever she is offended with the
bitterness of truth. By degrees, the reign of fancy is confirmed; she
grows first imperious, and in time despotick. Then fictions begin
to operate as realities, false opinions fasten upon the mind, and
life passes in dreams of rapture or of anguish.16

In all her novels, Jane Austen dramatizes the imagination’s
“dreams of rapture” and “luscious falsehood,” which Imlac with such
alarm describes to Rasselas. When Elinor Dashwood, in Sense and
Sensibility, refuses to speculate about the fragments of Colonel Bran
don’ mysterious narrative, for example, her sister Marianne, we are
told, would have speedily and mistakenly fabricated an entire story
“under her active imagination.” In Pride and Prejudice, the highspirited Lydia Bennet, who marries a charming rake, tends to see the
world through the creative eye of fancy.” Edmund Bertram, in Mans
field Park, for a long time forms an illusory conception of Mary
Crawford, who he eventually tells Fanny has been “the creature of
[his] own imagination.” Emma Woodhouse, an extraordinary “imagi
nist” who can take “an idea and make every thing bend to it,” learns
after many blunders the necessary “subjection of the fancy to the
understanding.” Even Anne Elliot of Persuasion, the most rational of
all Jane Austen’s heroines, recognizes with embarrassment, “What
wild imaginations one forms, where dear self is concerned!”17
Catherine Morland, more than any other Austen heroine, is par
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ticularly susceptible to the imagination’s “luscious falsehood” and
“dreams of rapture.” A few days after her introduction to Henry
Tilney, for example, she searches for him all over the Upper and Lower
Rooms of Bath, but her inquiries are futile, for Henry has unexpect
edly left the city, without even leaving his name in the social register.
“This sort of mysteriousness, which is always becoming in a hero,”
Jane Austen comments, “threw a fresh grace in Catherine’s imagina
tion around his person and manners, and increased her anxiety to
know more of him” (35-36). Unable to learn anything of Henry’s
absence from her friends, the Thorpes, but encouraged by Isabella to
think of him, Catherine indulges her imagination on Henry’s charac
ter, and “his impression on her fancy was not suffered to weaken.”
John and Isabella’ plan to ride to Blaize Castle is especially delight
ful to Catherine’s imagination, disappointed as she has been by her
interrupted engagement with the Tilneys. “The delight of exploring
an edifice like Udolpho, as her fancy represented Blaize Castle to be,”
Jane Austen explains, “was such a counterpoise of good, as might
console her for almost anything” (86). General Tilney’ invitation
later to visit Northanger Abbey is even more delightful in Catherine’s
imagination, for her “passion for ancient edifices was next in degree
to her passion for Henry Tilney—and castles and abbeys made usu
ally the charm of those reveries which his image did not fill” (141).
Even after Catherine is disabused of all her fancied expectations
about Northanger and the General, she looks forward with still
greater imaginary delights to Henry’ humble parsonage at Wood
ston: “What a revolution in her ideas! she, who had so longed to be in
an abbey! Now, there was nothing so charming to her imagination as
the unpretending comfort of a well-connected Parsonage, something
like Fullerton, but better” (212).
Although Catherine is particularly susceptible to “dreams of rap
ture,” no one in Northanger Abbey, save perhaps Henry Tilney, really
escapes the deceptions of an active fancy. When her social climbing
friend Isabella receives James’ letter announcing his parents’ appro
val of their engagement, she (mistakenly) “knew enough to feel secure
of an honourable and speedy establishment, and her imagination took
a rapid flight over its attendant felicities” (122). Even as reliable a
figure as Eleanor Tilney acknowledges her susceptibility to the decep
tions of the fancy. Though she recognizes, in one of her many conver
sations with Catherine, that historians are as capable as literary
writers of “flights of fancy” and of “imagination,” she claims, “1 am
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fond of history—and am very well contented to take the false with the
true” (109). As for the imaginary “embellishments” with which histo
rians sometimes write, Eleanor concludes: “They are embellishments,
and 1 like them as such. If a speech be well drawn up, 1 read it with
pleasure, by whomsoever it may be made—and probably with much
greater, if the production of
Hume or Mr. Robertson, than if the
genuine words of Caractacus, Agricola, or Alfred the Great.”
Although Eleanor knows that the historian’ pleasurable “flights of
fancy” are not true, Catherine does not.
Thus far, Catherine’ imagination has been responsible for rela
tively harmless sallies of unreality. It is capable of much worse. As Dr.
Johnson never tired of pointing out, “All power of fancy over reason is
a degree of insanity.”18 A faithful representation of the prevailing
Lockean epistemology, the poet Imlac’ discourse to Rasselas on the
ideas that despotically take hold of the mind recalls the passage in
Locke’ chapter “Of the Association of Ideas,” in which he observes:
“I shall be pardoned for calling [an unreasonable association of ideas]
by harsh a name as madness, when it is considered that opposition
to reason deserves that name, and is really madness; and there is
scarce a man so free from it, but that if he should always, on all
occasions, argue or do as in some cases he constantly does, would not
be thought fitter for Bedlam than civil conversation.”19 Some of our
ideas, in Locke’ theory, have a “natural” correspondence “founded in
their peculiar beings.”20 Yet they become so united in men’s minds
that it is very hard to separate them. “The ideas of goblins and
sprites,” Locke explains in a characteristic example, “have really no
more to do with darkness than light: yet let but a foolish maid incul
cate these often on the mind of a child, and raise them there together,
possibly he shall never be able to separate them again so long as he
lives, but darkness shall ever afterwards bring with it those frightful
ideas, and they shall be so joined, that he can no more bear the one
than the other.”21
Jane Austen, it would be fair to say, considers Catherine Mor
land’s chance association of ideas in her imagination as a “degree of
insanity.” In a comic but significant conversation with Eleanor and
Henry Tilney, for example, Jane Austen anticipates the “madness” to
which Catherine’s imagination eventually leads when the young
heroine informs her friends that “something very shocking indeed,
will soon come out in London,” that she does not know who the author
is, that it is to be “more horrible than any thing we have met with yet,”
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and that she “shall expect murder and every thing of the kind” (112).
Misinterpreting Catherine’ rather obvious references to the publica
tion of a new Gothic novel, Eleanor imagines instead a large-scale
social riot. Henry therefore steps in to clear the air, and reminds his
sister of the danger of mental imbalance: “My dear Eleanor, the riot is
only in your own brain. The confusion there is scandalous.” Asserting
that Eleanor has not rationally conceived that “such words could
relate only to a circulating library,” Henry describes for the two young
women Eleanor’s imaginary horrors—“a mob of three thousand men
assembled in St. George’ Fields; the Bank attacked, the Tower threat
ened, the streets of London flowing with blood, a detachment of the
12th Light Dragoons, (the hopes of the nation,) called up from North
ampton to quell the insurgents, and the gallant Captain Frederick
Tilney, in the moment of charging at the head of his troop, knocked off
his horse by a brickbat from an upper window” (113). Although Elea
nor is the immediate object of Henry’ ridicule, the larger butt of irony
here is the naive imagination, which functions without commonsense
attention, observation, and experience. To credit Henry’ rebuke of
imaginary terrors with a larger and “subversive” dramatic irony
which ultimately vindicates the imagination, since his description is
constructed out of the actual details of the 1780 Gordon Riots and since
the entire scene foreshadows the metamorphosis of Catherine’s imagi
nary horrors at Northanger Abbey into the real social dangers of
Bath—as several critics have done—is to misread the pervasive, fun
damental irony that imagination, in operating independently of real,
factual experience, has led the individual to a kind of intellectual
disorder, which Henry calls a “riot” in the brain.22
Surely the principal meaning emerging from Catherine’s ex
periences at Northanger Abbey is that her imagination—like Elea
nor’s in this scene—has led to an aptly described mental “riot,” in
which Gothic expectations are thoroughly entangledin her mind. Her
premature ideas about the abbey, for example, are a disturbing collec
tion of Gothic ramparts and cloisters, “long damp passages,” “narrow
cells and ruined chapel,” “traditional legends,” and “some awful
memorials of an injured and ill-fated nun.” So active are Catherine’
thoughts that even after her inquiries are matter-of-factly answered
by Eleanor, Catherine is assured of Northanger Abbey conforming to
her imaginary expectations. Teasing Catherine about these expecta
tions on the drive to the abbey, Henry smiles and inquires if she has
“formed a very favourable idea of the abbey” (157). “To be sure I
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have," she replies, “Is not it a fine old place, just like what one reads
about?” But a “fine old place" and “what one reads about” are hardly
the same thing. Entering the grounds of the abbey along a smooth and
level road of fine gravel without obstacle or alarm of any kind seems to
her “odd and inconsistent” with
preconceived ideas (161). She does
not expect to see furniture that displays only modern elegance. The
fireplace of her imagination, with its ample and ponderous carvings of
former times, proves to be only a “Rumford, with slabs of plain though
handsome marble, and ornaments over it of the prettiest English
China.” The Gothic windows, too, all “so large, so clear, so bright,” are
“yet less what her fancy had portrayed." In fact, “to an imagination
which had hoped for the smallest divisions, and the heaviest stone
work, for painted glass, dirt and cobwebs, the difference was very
distressing” (162).
Catherine’s habitual association of Gothic structures with the
Gothic horrors she has read about is, however, not easily disen
tangled. Her imagination presses forward to find something distress
ing in
situation. In
room she finds a large chest, which to
Catherine’s imagination is very strange. It does not occur to her that
the remains of its silver handles have been worn with age. On the
contrary, her fancy suggests that they have been prematurely broken
“by some strange violence” (163). On the lid is clearly painted the
letter “T,” which she might reasonably assume represents “Tilney,”
but to Catherine’s imagination it is a “mysterious cypher.” She opens
the chest only to find a white cotton bedspread. On her return to the
room after dinner, the sight of the old chest is an embarrassing
reminder of the “causeless fears of
idle fancy,” yet the sudden
discovery of
antique black cabinet only generates her fanciful
associations once more. The following morning’s examination
teaches her the “absurdity of her recent fancies”—the corrective to her
imaginary ideas being the actual material evidence before her eyes
(173). Glancing over the page with a startled look, Catherine wonders,
“Could it be possible, or did not
senses play her false?—An inven
tory of linen, in coarse and modern characters, seemed all that was
before her! If the evidence of sight might be trusted, she held a wash
ing bill in
hand” (172).
Though humbled by such
experience, Catherine fabricates
even larger train of ideas about General Tilney. On the flimsy basis of
the General’s unwillingness to show her a part of the abbey and of his
refusal to join her and Eleanor on his wife’s favorite walk, Catherine is
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convinced that the General must have tortured and murdered her, or
at least permanently immured her. Learning that the General was
dissatisfied with Mrs. Tilney’ portrait and that it hangs in Eleanor’s
bedroom, instead of the drawing room where it was intended, Cathe
rine most unreasonably surmises, “Here was another proof. A
portrait—very like—of a departed wife, not valued by the husband!—
He must have been dreadfully cruel to her!” (181). When the General
calls her hastily from one end of the house, his “evident desire of
preventing such an examination” is an additional piece of proof in her
mind. “Something,” she concludes, “was certainly to be concealed; her
fancy, though it had trespassed lately once or twice, could not mislead
her here” (186). As though in mockery of the reasonable exertion of a
balanced mind, Catherine imagines “in all probability” that the Gen
eral has never entered his wife’ room since his dreadful torture of her.
Horrible ideas spring into Catherine’ mind, and she finds many
examples to justify her blackest suspicions. At length Catherine
decides to explore the rooms and find material proof to satisfy her
suspicions, but all she discovers is a “large, well-proportioned apart
ment, an handsome dimity bed, arranged as unoccupied with an
housemaid’s care, a bright Bath stove, mahogany wardrobes, and
neatly-painted chairs, on which the warm beams of a western sun
gaily poured through two sash windows”—metaphorically shedding
on Catherine’ mind “a ray of common sense” (193). Henry Tilney’s
pointed reminder to her, when he discovers her in the empty room,
emphasizes the significant aspect of her cognitive awakening. “What
have you been judging from?” he asks; “consult your own understand
ing, your own sense of the probable, your own observation, of what
passing around you....Dearest Miss Morland, what ideas have you
been admitting?” (197-98). Judgment, understanding, observation, a
sense of the probable—all play a significant role in Catherine’ release
from the associations of her imagination. The “visions of romance,”
we are told, are now over. Completely awakened, Catherine now opens
her eyes to the “extravagance of her late fancies” and to the “liberty
which her imagination had dared to take.” That evening, before she
retires, she reflects on the foolishness which “had been all a volun
tary, self-created delusion, each trifling circumstance receiving impor
tance from an imagination resolved on alarm, and every thing forced
to bend to one purpose by a mind which, before she entered the Abbey,
had been craving to be frightened” (200). Far from being a source of
truth, Catherine’ imagination, because of its exaggeration and false

Published by eGrove, 1983

9

Studies in English, New Series, Vol. 4 [1983], Art. 9

Peter L. DeRose

71

association of Gothic-romantic ideas with reality, is invariably the
locus of deception.
III

Complementing the broad parody of the imagination in Nor
thanger Abbey is Jane Austen’s comic representation of real life,
which draws bold attention to the way character and behavior actu
ally or commonly appear, and not the way they are imagined in
fictional romances. Running counter to the reader’ expectations, the
comic-realistic narrative of Catherine Morland’s life is an anti
romance, in which, as Johnson explains in Rambler
4, “life [is
exhibited] in its true state, diversified only by accidents that daily
happen in the world, and influenced by passions and qualities which
are really to be found in conversing with mankind” (Works, 3:19). “No
one who had ever seen Catherine Morland in her infancy,” Jane
Austen opens her anti-romance, “would have supposed her born to be
an heroine” (14). Not only are her family ordinary and “plain matterof-fact people” who experience the “common feelings of common life,”
but Catherine herself has “by nature nothing heroic about her.” Her
father is not a domestic tyrant, and her mother did not die—after the
fashion of romances—in childbirth. Catherine is not beautiful, and
she is not prodigiously accomplished. There is no heroic youth in the
neighborhood to fall in love with, no young lord, foundling, squire’s
son, no ward brought up in her family.23 Catherine’ entry into the
public life of Bath, moreover, is marked by nothing unusual or roman
tic. At her first dance, she is not, in the hyperbolical language of
romance, called “a divinity” by anyone (23). Her first conversation
with Henry Tilney in the Lower Rooms involves “such matters as
naturally arose from the objects around them” (25). Her conversation
with Eleanor Tilney involves “common-place chatter,” and Eleanor’s
manner during this exchange shows none of the “exaggerated feel
ings of extatic delight or inconceivable vexation on every trifling
occurrence” (56-57).
For all Catherine’s impressionability to her friend Isabella’
affectations and recommended reading, she possesses a common
degree of common sense. When Catherine sees Mr. Tilney speaking
with a fashionable, attractive young woman, who is leaning on his
arm, for example, she immediately assumes the woman is his sister,
thus losing, in a characteristically anti-heroic manner, an opportun
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ity of considering him lost to her for ever, by being already married.
Jane Austen contrasts the falsifying romance version of such a situa
tion with the realistic version, founded on probabilities and facts:
Guided only by what was simple and probable, it had never
her head that Mr. Tilney could be married; he had not
he had not talked, like the married men to whom she had
been used; he had never
a wife, and he had acknowl
edged sister. From these circumstances sprang the instant con
clusion of his sister’s now being by his side; and therefore, instead
of turning deathlike paleness, and falling in fit on Mrs. Allen’s
bosom, Catherine sat erect, in the perfect use of her senses, and
cheeks only little redder than usual. (53)

Often, in fact, guided not by her active imagination but by what is
“simple and probable,” by “circumstances,” by observation and
remembrance, and by the “perfect use of her senses,” Catherine’s
is used to demonstrate, as Jane Austen says, that “strange things may
generally accounted for if their cause be fairly searched out” (16).
Consequently, after a bewildering and short-lived excursion among
the fantasies of romance at Northanger Abbey, Catherine resolves to
act with “the greatest good sense” and learns to accept the “anxieties
of common life” instead of the “alarms’ of romance” (201). When
General Tilney dismisses her from the abbey, having learned of her
ordinary background, Catherine realizes that the anxiety thus caused
“mournfully superior in reality and substance” than any she has
encountered in Mrs. Radcliffe’s romances, for it has “foundation in
fact” and “in probability.” With her mind now focused on “actual and
natural evil,” she returns to her home in a hack post-chaise “without
[heroic] accident or alarm.” A “probable circumstance” (Eleanor’s
marriage to a man of fortune placates the General’s greed) facilitates
her wedding with Henry (25). Henry’s affection for Catherine,
moreover, we are told, has originated in “nothing better than grati
tude” for Catherine’s affection for him. “It is a new circumstance in
romance, and dreadfully derogatory of an heroine’s dignity,” Jane
Austen reminds us, “but if it be as new in common life, the credit of a
wild imagination will at least be all my own” (243).
The comic realism in Northanger Abbey serves an obvious moral
purpose, best described by Johnson’s Rambler no. 4, in discussing
novels that “serve as lectures of conduct, and introductions into life.”
Unlike romances, in which “every transaction and sentiment [is] so
remote from all that passes among men, that the reader [is] in very
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little danger of making any applications to himself" and in which
“virtues and crimes [are] equally beyond his sphere of activity,” novels which portray the life of an adventurer who is “levelled with the
rest of the world” and who “ acts in such scenes of the universal drama,
as may be the lot of any other man” can be morally instructive (Works,
3:21):
The purpose of these writings
surely not only to show man
kind, but to
that they may be
hereafter with less
hazard; to teach the means
avoiding the snares which are laid
by Treachery for Innocence, without infusing any wish for that
superiority with which the betrayer flatters his vanity; to give the
power of counteracting fraud, without the temptation to practice
it; to initiate youth by mock encounters in the art of necessary
defence, and to increase prudence without impairing virtue.

(Works,

3:22-23;

The “mock encounters” that the innocent Catherine experiences in
her relationships with her false friends, the Thorpes, and with General Tilney illuminate for her and for the reader at once that real
people are more complex than imaginary heroes and that real life
situations ironically can be more deceptive and treacherous than
those encountered in fiction.
That Catherine is the innocent in this moral paradigm is evident
from her naive, uninformed responses to lifelike situations. When she
first leaves home, she goes “looking forward to pleasures untasted and
unalloyed, and free from the apprehension of evil as from the knowl
edge of it” (237). Almost at the close of her story, too, Henry is referring
to Catherine when he asks Eleanor to be ready to welcome a sister-inlaw who is “open, candid, artless, guileless, with affections strong but
simple, forming no pretensions, and knowing no disguise” (206). At
every turn in her development, Catherine displays her innocence, as
when with childlike simplicity, she tells John Thorpe that to marry for
money “the wickedest thing in existence” (124). Estimating character and behavior in terms of her own naive imagination, she imputes
nothing but good nature to the impudent, conceited, and disingenuous
Thorpe and to his selfish, shrewd, and calculating sister Isabella; and
for a while she is completely deceived by the smooth social hypocrisy
and mercenariness of General Tilney.
Catherine and the reader alike learn two significant lessons from
her encounters with the Thorpes and General Tilney. Both learn what

Johnson calls the “art of necessary defence” against the real fraudu-
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lence and treachery of human society. More significantly, their intro
duction to the ways of the world teaches them that human nature is
more complex and difficult to understand than one naively
imagines.21 They both recognize, to use Johnson’s words, the limits of
“virtues and crimes” that exist within the probable “sphere of
[human] activity” (Rambler 4, Works, 3:21). For a time both Catherine
and the reader believe, for example, that the General is one of those
“unnatural and overdrawn” characters of the imagination, who are
represented in fictional romances like The Mysteries of Udolpho, and
who are capable of unalloyed
(181). As Dr. Johnson observes,
however, “to imagine that every one who is not completely good is
irrecoverably abandoned, is to suppose that all are capable of the
same degree of excellence; it is indeed to exact, from all, that perfection
which none can attain” (Rambler 70—Works, 4:6). Catherine’s awak
ening into the real world of experience gives the lie to this imaginary
assumption:
Charming as were all Mrs. Radcliffe’s works, and charming
even as were the works of all her imitators, it was not in them
perhaps that human nature, at least in the midland counties of
England, was to be looked for....Among the Alps and Pyrenees,
perhaps, there were no mixed characters. There, such as were not
spotless as an angel, might have the dispositions of a fiend. Butin
England it was not so; among the English, she believed, in their
hearts and habits, there was a general though unequal mixture of
good and bad. Upon this conviction, she would not be surprised if
even
Henry and Eleanor Tilney, some slight imperfection
might hereafter appear; and upon this conviction she need not
fear to acknowledge some actual specks the character of their
father, who, though cleared from the grossly injurious suspicions
which she must ever blush to have entertained, she did believe,
upon serious consideration, to be not perfectly amiable. (200)

Though there is much irony at Catherine’ expense, in believing that
unnatural characters may yet live in the Alps and Pyrenees, Cathe
rine’s reflections, thoroughly consistent with her unsophisticated
character, nevertheless represent a major advance in her moral educa
tion. Catherine acquires the Johnsonian view that the heroes and
villains of imaginary romances are really “beings of another species”
whose actions are “regulated upon motives of their own, and who
[have] neither faults nor excellencies in common” with humanity
{Rambler 4— Works, 3:21). Recognizing through experience the com
plexity of human character and behavior, Catherine, as well as the
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reader of Northanger Abbey, learns that real people are not usually
murderers, but are more frequently mercenary, cunning, hypocritical
and vain—and sometimes, as with Eleanor and Henry, even habitu
ally, though not perfectly, good.
Common sense, experience, and observation, then, are ultimately
what rescue Catherine Morland and the reader from the illusory world
of the imagination, and restore them to a sobering apprehension of
reality. To say more than this—that Jane Austen’s irony, directed
primarily against the active imagination and the Gothic-sentimental
romances that nurture it, turns upon itself to undercut even the direct
experience of sensory reality—is to misrepresent the Lockean episte
mology upon which her parody is built, and to misconstrue her evident
moral intention. In Northanger Abbey Jane Austen narrates the
amusing story of an ingenue encountering and learning from the
deceptions of the real world; with a traditional moral purpose and an
eighteenth-century epistemology she achieves a complex fusion of
bold parody and broad comic-realism.
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